Atheism versus Theism

We humans are very likely to say that there are “two ways” to look at this issue or that one.  One of these dichotomies is atheism versus theism.  Of course that single pair-matching of ideas is not the only one that might command our attentions, but it is unsurpassed in its attachment to the ultimate questions of existence—is our sphere of existence understood to be in the realm of the divine, or not?  The question would seem to be foundational, and it would seem to have only two possible answers—though of course neither its foundational nature nor its yes/no construction is immune to possible objections.  (The philosopher’s duty to challenge us with objections to the above is where this piece is headed.)

I am reminded of the American tussle—played out in so many ways.  If our republic is to be based on a foundation discovered by people grasping and responding to the nature of the universe, then what form does that foundation assume?  If the world is not ordered by the divine, then by what is it ordered?

A person can embrace religious freedom—pressed ever forward as an ideal, and still maintain that our republic is founded on the divine.  As a person’s pursuit of the ideal of religious freedom in a theistic framework approaches a refined state, that person can be simultaneously assailed as a latent theocrat, on the one hand, and as a purveyor of neutered, empty religion on the other.  Similarly a proponent of a secular state can be simultaneously thought of as an enemy of the religious, on the one hand, and a temporizer with religion on the other—if, as has been the experience of nation-building—it is deemed necessary to declare some ultimate foundation of the state.  The brotherhood of man, for example, is a fine foundation for a secular state—though it might well be thought to presume a father.

Considered fairly and openly—theism versus atheism:  What is it but our unquestioning assumption that we deserve a settled state of belief, that leads us to claim this or that position?  Is not our belief that we can justifiably hold to a solid foundation the real creed of our religion or irreligion, and are not we—granted by ourselves the right and power to bless that attachment—the gods of our very own creeds?

Jesus said, “If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not.  But if I do, though ye believe me not, believe the works” (John 10:37-38, KJV).  Belief, in this context, is not understood as a positive assertion of the (unprovable) existence of God, nor is it even an assertion that our understanding of existence is such as would warrant belief in God (an equally unprovable assertion.)  Rather, the issue at hand is our willingness to consider whether the thrust of Jesus’ works (their historical verifiability being less provable than anything else) comports with our understanding of the ultimate.

That is the dichotomy that matters: our willingness (or not) to address the ultimate (the theism-versus-atheism question) in an enlivened fashion.

Neither fair-mindedness nor openness will permit us to state that we have decided once and for all.  In truth, we can only responsibly say that we hold to this or that side of any dichotomy when our predisposition is to challenge ourselves on whether we might attach ourselves to the other side.

When we die, the greatest evidence of a sincere belief in God is a demonstration on our part that our belief survives even our attempt to deconstruct our belief in God.  The opposite but complementary procedure is the one morally incumbent on atheists.  In the end the processes are one and the same—a dynamic endeavor.